Peter Balakian: Progress, Obstacles, Hope: 92 Years Later
In the past 10 years there has been significant progress in the creation of solid and rich intellectual discourse about the Armenian Genocide, and this includes not only academic scholarship but art, literature, film, etc. The progress has had an impact on Armenians in the Diaspora and the Republic, on the international arena, and on life inside Turkey as well. As the discourse about the events of 1915 has created openings between Turks and Armenians, it has also generated violent response and backlash from the Turkish state and Turkish nationalists. There is a quandary that is often typical in the process of social change. Armenians in the Diaspora and in the Republic and Turks in Turkey and in Diaspora are defined in certain ways by this process of change. The presence of Turkish intellectuals has made a significant difference to Armenians in this process. Notwithstanding the aggressive campaigns of the Turkish government and “the deep state”, there is hope for creating ties between the two cultures and a common understanding of the events of 1915. Explorations of track 2 diplomacy have been occurring in various ways and forms over the past several years. Part of this process must revolve around a truthful and common understanding of what genocide is.
Another aspect of this process will have to deal with the cultural values that shape Armenians and Turks respectively. It is clear that Armenians need to understand Turks better and Turks need to understand Armenians better. For example, understanding would be furthered if Turks can understand how certain psychological issues define Armenian culture and Armenian identity, and of course, the same is true for Armenians as they seek to understand Turks.
The discourse about the Armenian Genocide needs to be de-ethnicized; and the more scholars outside of both cultures become involved in the conversation with Armenians and Turks the better. The term Armenian Genocide was first used by Raphael Lemkin, the man who invented the term genocide, and who was a Polish Jew. I believe scholars who study genocide are vitally important to this discourse in ways that are different than those of scholars who are a part of national discourses or area studies. Scholars of genocide bring to the study of genocide a comparative and global perspective. Their work has demonstrated how the Armenian Genocide is part of a history that is modern and pre-modern. Turkish culture would benefit from a comparative perspective on genocide; such a perspective would allow Turkey to see that Turkey is not alone in this history. If there can be intellectual freedom, open discourse between Turkish and Armenian and international scholars and artists and intellectuals inside Turkey (this would mean genuine change), can Turkish society move toward the next phase of democracy? Since the Armenian Genocide is part of ”and only part of” Turkey’s democracy movement, how can Armenians in the Diaspora help this process? How do they hinder it?

Halil Berktay: A genocide, three constituencies, thoughts for the future
The horrible legacy of 1915 continues to cast a long shadow over, and to affect the political cultures, mentalities or horizons of, mainly three groups of people : (1) the Armenians of Armenia; (2) Armenians of the diaspora; and (3) Turks in Turkey and elsewhere. Each of these three constituencies stands to gain, albeit in different ways, from reconciliation through genocide recognition, broadly understood (whether this means the widespread dissemination and acceptance of the historical truth in Turkish civil society, or an Establishment act of recognition, or both). Each constituency also has its specific strengths and weaknesses. Among other things, they have been separated and isolated from, and to distrust or suspect, each other for far too long. Partly as a result, they have come to embody (a) different levels of historical knowledge and understanding; (b) different political experiences and vocabularies in current time; (c) different assessments of the external and internal dynamics available. These and other factors are all reflected in the present outlook of the diverse intellectual elites that claim to be speaking on behalf of all three constituencies. Is it possible to arrive at a common road-map ? In particular, without mincing any words about the backwardness or defensiveness of many Turks’ historical knowledge or understanding, is it also possible to engage in a constructive critique of the present “genocide recognition politics” pursued by many Armenian groups, which almost invariably revolve around a Turkish-state-vs-Armenians axis, in favor of prioritizing a more horizontal, more civil society, more Turks-and-Armenians-together type of education, information and consciousness-raising approach to fostering inter-communal, inter-constituency conversations ? A related question has to do with whether to opt for a legal, textbook definition of “denialism” or a working, on-hands, situationist understanding of the mental-emotional core of denial. The two problems are closely connected.Whether “denialism” is to be defined in a maximalist or a minimalist way has a great deal to do with whether we end up regarding huge grey zones as “enemies” or as potential allies. Simultaneously, opting for directly confronting the state establishment from the outside runs the risk of driving all these grey zones into the arms of Turkish nationalism.

Henry Theriault: Dominance and Resistance: Re-installing Power at the Center of Armeno-Turkish Relations
Armenian-Turkish dialogue efforts over the past decade have taken various forms, from informal email discussions to academic conferences. Yet, all have shared the same structural assumption: Armenian and Turkish participants, taken as representatives of their respective communities, are treated as equivalent parties in a balanced structure. This assumption ignores the basic nature of the Armenian-Turkish relationship, that it has been and remains a dominance relationship. Prior to the Armenian Genocide, the millet system institutionalized the Turkish conquest of Armenians in a hierarchy of Turks and other Muslims over Armenians. The Armenian Genocide pushed this dominance to the most extreme level possible. The end of the Genocide has mistakenly been viewed as the end of dominance, but in fact because nothing substantive has yet been done to address the Genocide or earlier oppression, the post-Genocide era has merely consolidated the hyper-domination of Turks over Armenians produced by the Genocide. This paper explores the ways in which failure to recognize the Turkish over Armenian dominance relation has undercut dialogue efforts as well as supported maintenance of the dominance relation itself. It argues that meaningful positive change in Armenian-Turkish relations can occur only if the dominance issue becomes a central focus.

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